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Modes of Procedural Reform
By RICHARD L. MARCUS'
I. Introduction
During what has been called the "Golden Age of Rulemaking,"
giants trod the soil of rulemaking. Drawing from the legacy of
Jeremy Bentham, David Dudley Field, and Roscoe Pound, a small
band of drafters created the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the
late 1930s and changed the American procedural landscape. Their
reforms included completing Field's effort to bury technical
pleading requirements and adopting a revolutionary set of
discovery provisions. More recently, the federal rulemakers' 1966
revision of the class action rule has had at least revolutionary
consequences, sometimes in the teeth of what the rulemakers said
they wanted to do.'
As the above description of the most dramatic American
experience illustrates, procedural reform can be an exhilarating thing.
Because procedural reform appears to be an unending effort in many
countries, it seems worthwhile to reflect on the modes of achieving
such reforms, for that arguably could affect the content of the
reforms. This paper focuses primarily on the American experience to
offer a tentative initial inquiry into whether there is a connection
between the modes and the nature of procedural reform. The
ultimate question is whether the idea merits further comparative
study.
At the outset, the paper offers some general observations about
different modes of procedural reform and the considerations that
* Horace 0. Coil ('57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law. This paper was delivered at the XIII World Congress on Procedural Law
in Salvador, Brazil, on September 20,2007, and included in the booklet prepared for
that Congress. Some of this analysis is also used for different purposes in Richard
Marcus, Confessions of a Federal "Bureaucrat": The Possibi'kes of Perfecting
ProceduralReforms, 35 WN. ST. L. REv. - (forthcoming 2008).
1. Richard Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking, 80 WASH. U. L. REV. 901, 901
(2002).
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would seem to bear on whether they meet with success. These
general observations suggest, at least in the abstract, some
consequences that would seem to flow from adopting one or another
form for reform.
The paper then turns to how the American experience fits into
the models initially presented. It first sketches the evolution of
reform efforts in American procedure from the mid 19th to the mid
20th century, and then focuses particularly on the experiences of the
past generation, partly from the perspective of an insider in the
procedure reform process.2 That experience shows that American
procedural reform has been achieved in different ways at different
times, and that the recent period has seen a marked shift to legislative
action from immediately previous generations, when the
pathbreaking changes were made by expert groups like the one that
produced the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
From that American experience, the paper reflects on a limited
comparative analysis, drawing briefly on the reform experiences of
three other countries - England, Germany, and Japan. On balance, it
finds, there is no strong reason to think that the mode of procedural
reform is crucial to the content or speed of reform in the U.S., leaving
for further work the question whether other systems support a
different conclusion.
II. Typology Of Modes Of Procedural Reform
As with any other type of reform, procedural reform could be
sought in a number of different ways. A despot, for example, could
simply command changes in procedure as with any other changes.
But it does not seem that any modern system of procedure was
significantly shaped by despotic action, so that model does not merit
consideration as a serious mode for actual reform. A number of
others do seem worthy of consideration, and it is possible to offer
some speculations about their possible inclinations. In addition, it
seems worthwhile to reflect on some additional factors that could
bear on the emergence of one or another mode of reform in a given
society.
2. Since 1996, I have served as Special Reporter to the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States. That committee is the body
that generates and evaluates proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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A. Development By The Judiciary
From the common law tradition, it seems natural to imagine that
procedure would be developed by judges, because all "law" was
developed by judges. In the famous words of Maine, English
substantive law "has at first the look of being gradually secreted in
the interstices of procedure."3 Of necessity, courts could devise and
refine procedures for handling all sorts of cases. Indeed, the
American procedural historian Millar surmised that common law
developments would begin with procedure and gradually subordinate
it to substantive law:
Ever do we see that procedure has been the major element,
substantive law the minor in the growth of the legal order, and that
procedure has been signally procreative of the substantive rule.
But in our law, as elsewhere, the trend of development diminishes
the place of procedure and enlarges that of substantive law.... [Ilt
is an inevitable process and ends with inversion of the early
relationship between the two sets of rules. Procedure remains a
necessity, but men come to the understanding that the true role of
procedure is an ancillary one. In the household of the law
procedure ceases to be the materfamilias and is now the
handmaiden.4
Indeed, the chief framer of our Federal Rules used a similar
metaphor for his reforms - the "Handmaid of Justice."5
How would judges likely handle reforms for this handmaiden?
One might anticipate that judges would be reluctant reformers of the
procedures they themselves had designed. Indeed, in the common
law tradition, all legal reform by court decision has tended to be
gradual. Even though procedure was supposed to be the handmaiden
to achieving substantive justice, it would seem unlikely that judges
would embrace revolutionary breakthroughs. The English experience
provides some support for this view. Thus, when pleading niceties
began to be regarded as interfering with achieving justice on the
merits in the late 18th and early 19th century, the first effort at reform
came through judicial action. Eventually, this effort produced the
Rules of Hilary Term, the first English rules of court to have the force
of law.6  These procedural reforms worsened the problem by
3. HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1907).
4. ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE TRIAL COURT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (1952).
5. See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938).
6. See Roffery v. Smith, 172 Eng. Rep. 1409, 1409-10 (1834) (noting that the Rules
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magnifying the exacting pleading standards that had caused the
problem, as exemplified in Crogate's Case and satirized in the
Dialogue in the Shades.7 Partly due to that disappointing experience
with procedural reform by judges, the English mode of reform shifted
to legislative action (discussed next).8
Besides conservatism, one might expect judicial reforms to be
tailored to the self-interest of judges. Thus, judges might be expected
to embrace reforms that would maximize their freedom of movement
and disregard the interests of both litigants and lawyers when those
interests interfered with their own discretion.9
B. Legislative Development
If one wants to pry the levers of procedural reform out of judges'
hands, the legislature is a likely force to accomplish that objective.
Certainly the 19th century English experience seems consistent with
that view; after the failure of the Rules of Hilary Term, Parliament
stepped in with a series of Judicature Acts that made fundamental
changes in the procedure in English courts. At least the legislature
would not be hamstrung by judicial conservatism or by judges' desire
to reduce the burdens on them and thus serve their self-interest.
But legislatures would suffer from other problems. First, they
are not as familiar with the problems as judges, and might make
mistakes in diagnosing those problems or formulating solutions to
them. One might therefore expect more frequent "mistake" reforms
that would backfire. Second, legislatures are more likely than judges
to succumb to pressure from special interest groups. Procedural rules
of Hilary Term were the first rules of court to have the force of law).
7. See GEORGE HAYES, Crogate's Case.'A Dialogue in Ye Shades, reprinted in 9 A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 417-31 (W.S. Holdsworth ed., 1926). This parody was a
scathing attack on the strictness of the pleading requirements of the Rules of Hilary
Term. One of the most famous rulings under those rules was in Crogate's Case, holding
that Crogate had no right to proceed because of violation of the rules. The parody is a
conversation in Heaven between the ghost of Crogate and a Baron Surrebutter,
supposedly a representative of Baron Parke, who was a moving force behind the rules.
8. Another reason for the shift to legislative action in England seems to have been
the conservatism of the bar. See Edson R. Sunderland, The English Struggle for
Procedural Reform, 39 HARV. L. REv. 725, 739 (1926) ("Early in the struggle it became
perfectly clear that the delegation of the control of procedural technique to the legal
profession was a policy which was socially unsound.").
9. For such an argument, see Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public
Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994); compare Janet
Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 647
(1994) (questioning the assertion that judges will significantly favor their self-interests in
rulemaking).
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can be of interest to such groups, so that a legislature may ornament a
procedural code with a myriad of special provisions to benefit one or
another of these groups. Compared to this possibility, the risk of
some self-dealing by judges designing procedures may seem rather
benign.
C. Leaving Procedure to the "Experts"
Because procedure seems dry and technical, there is an argument
that it should be designed (and reformed) by experts. Their study
could usefully identify difficulties with the way current procedures are
operating, and might even provide reliable methods of evaluating
substitute procedures. At least in some Western European countries,
it seems, such expert groups are given substantial authority to
generate procedural codes that are then adopted by legislatures. This
method might avoid the self-interest problem of leaving the design of
procedures to judges, and the interest group problem of leaving the
design to legislatures.
The "expert" approach could have the additional advantage
(from the perspective of a group of professors) of giving substantial
authority in designing procedural reform to professors. Who else
would have the time for the study needed to develop and evaluate
procedural reforms? It may be that Japan provides an example of
this approach. Thus, we are told that "it is not likely that a court
confronted with a question of how to interpret a section of the
Code-including a section of the Code of Civil Procedure-would
refer back to legislative reports or debates. More likely relevant for
Japanese courts... are the opinions of scholars in the field and
bureaucratic experts (many of whom may have served on the study
group that gave rise to that law)."' Certainly Japan is closer to this
model than the United States: "The opinions of professors who have
spent their entire careers in analyzing the Codes are more significant
[in Japan] than the opinions of professors in the United States.""
Indeed, some others have seen this sort of technique as a method
to break the logjam of procedural reform. It may be that England
provides a model, with Lord Woolf having been tasked in the 1990s to
design a radical new procedural model and given authority to design
substitute methods. These reforms "represent the greatest shake-up
10. CARL F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 193 (2004).
11. Id at 165.
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in civil procedure since the 1870s. ' ' 2 And yet even these radical
reforms may not have gone far enough, and another delegation to
experts may be needed in England. Thus, Lord Justice Brooke urges
there that "the time must surely soon be coming when three, four, or
five wise people are mandated to consider the whole of our present
arrangements for controlling and apportioning the costs of litigation,
because we cannot go on for much longer as we are.
1 3
Yet one would have to be cautious about leaving everything to
the experts. To whom are they accountable? Should important social
institutions like courts depend for their design on what might be
academic fashion or even whim? Should court procedures be
designed by those who do not use them (and may even lack
experience in using them)?
D. Borrowing
Yet another way to accomplish procedural reform is to borrow
aspects of another procedural system, or perhaps the entire system
from another country. The possibility of that sort of borrowing is, of
course, a focus of much comparative scholarship. When it is done,
one introduces the fruit of another system's modes of procedural
reform from outside the recipient system.
Perhaps the leading example of such borrowing is Japan.
Lacking an organized court system in the mid-19th century, Japan
imported one. First, it looked to France, but later in the 19th century
its focus shifted to Germany, and Japan adopted a procedural system
modeled on the German procedure code." That borrowing can be
compared to the unsuccessful American attempt to impose features
of the American adversary system when the United States was the
occupying force after World War II. That effort, although it made
some changes, ultimately did not produce a longstanding shift in
Japanese procedure, which returned in significant ways to the pre-war
model."
E. Bottom-Up v. Top-Down Reform
Another consideration is whether procedural reforms are
12. NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE 30 (2003).
13. Lord Justice Brooke, Foreword to A.A.S. Zuckerman, Civil Procedure viii
(2003).
14. See GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 67 ("the Code of Civil Procedure was virtually
a Japanese translation of the German code").
15. See id., chp. 4.
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accomplished in what might be called a centrally planned manner, or
left to local innovation and on-the-ground creativity. The difference
between civil law and common law countries might suggest that the
former are more likely to adopt a centrally directed mode and the
latter more likely to adopt a dispersed technique. Indeed, it might
even be said that the common law method is inherently a bottom-up
approach, since it looks to the decision of individual judges (initially,
at least, by first-level judges) to establish and modify precedents.16
But at least some counterexamples exist; it is said, for example, that
England has a governmental structure singularly dominated by the
central government."
III. Themes in American Procedural Reform
The American experience has included reform efforts exhibiting
all of the above characteristics, and has embodied varying amounts of
devotion to bottom-up as opposed to top-down reform efforts.
Initially, U.S. procedure was based on borrowing, or one might
better call it inheritance, from England. The American colonies
adopted legal systems modeled on the common-law arrangement in
England. But from an early date, the American systems began to
diverge. For example, by 1796 the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the prevailing party usually could not recover its attorney
fees from the loser because "the general practice in the United States
is against it.""i England, of course, adopted the loser-pays rule found
in most of the rest of the world. In the United States, the right to jury
trial was enshrined in the Constitution and extended by judicial
decision through the 19th and 20th centuries,19 while in England use
of juries in civil cases atrophied in the 19th century.20
More significant for our purposes, however, is the fact that -
16. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI.
L. REv. 933 (2006) (comparing the common-law "bottom up" method of making law
with a legislative "top-down" approach).
17. At least the Economist thinks so. See A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
the Council, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2006, at 60 ("Power in Britain has long been
more centralised than in America or other European countries, but it has become more
so in the past 50 years."); Party Time, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2005 (England is "still
the most centralised state in western Europe").
18. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
19. See, e.g., RicHARD MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 529-602 (4th ed. 2005) (examining the
expansion of the right to jury trial).
20. See Zuckerman, supra note 13, at 357.
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from the start - the United States had a variety of judicial systems
larger than in most countries, and as a result a variety of procedural
systems. Each state had its own judicial system, and it was only
somewhat grudgingly that the federal government was even
authorized to create a federal judicial system.21 For the first century
and a half of its existence, the United States had a singularly weak
central government, although the Civil War somewhat expanded
federal power.
In procedure, the U.S. method was particularly diffuse. States
were free, in their court systems, to adopt reforms of whatever
character they found congenial. And the federal courts followed the
states' lead. By statute, from 1789 until the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were adopted in 1938, federal courts were to conform their
procedure to that prevailing in the state courts. This parallelism
meant that local lawyers did not have to learn a different set of
procedures to handle cases in federal court, but it also meant that
procedural reform could only be accomplished at the state level.2
The big American movement for procedural reform was known
as the Field Code. This effort had aspects of borrowing and was
accomplished by legislative action. The borrowing included
innovations resembling those introduced around the same time in
England by the Judicature Acts, such as an effort to shed the rigidities
of common-law pleading. At the same time, it drew its strength from
the more general codification movement, which sought to replace
judge-made common-law rules with codes of substantive law adopted
by legislatures. This movement reached its greatest strength in the
American west (in California, for example), but the procedural code
was also adopted in Field's home state of New York.
Although it depended on legislative adoption, one might best
locate the Field Code as a version of the "expert" strategy in
procedural innovation. It was sparked by David Dudley Field, an
extremely successful New York lawyer who threw his energies into
21. The Constitution creates a Supreme Court, and authorizes Congress to establish
lower federal courts. This provision was a compromise between those who thought that
the existence of a federal court system would intrude too much on the power of the
states and the view that a federal court system was essential. The first Congress
established a federal court system, so there has been one for the entire life of the
country.
22. It should be noted that Congress did adopt, over the years, a number of
procedural statutes that applied in federal court and displaced state provisions on the
subject. Nonetheless, this patchwork did not form anything approaching a procedural
code.
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the codification movement, and particularly the procedural code.2
Besides the English reform effort, Field drew on his own extensive
experience as a lawyer. Ultimately he had to persuade state
legislatures to adopt his codes, but his expertise was the driving force
behind them.
Although the Field Code sought dramatic innovations in
American procedure, its force was sometimes blunted because it
depended on legislative action. In many places the code came to be
festooned with provisions sought by special interests. And the
judiciary resisted some of its path-breaking innovations. For
example, in 1910 the Wisconsin Supreme Court lamented "[t]he cold,
not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code received from
the New York judges."'24 Judicial resistance to the reforms of the
Field Code might indicate that - at least in America - truly effective
procedural reform could come only with the concurrence of the
judiciary, even if it did not emerge from the judiciary in the first
place. The conservative effect of judges would not be entirely
overcome by imposition from without.
The major watershed in American procedural reform in the 20th
century was the adoption in 1934 of the Rules Enabling Act.25 That
legislation was the culmination of a long political gestation.26 The Act
authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of "practice and
procedure" for the federal courts that would supplant the state-court
practices that had previously been applied in federal court as well.
Congress gave no significant consideration to the content of these
rules, and the Supreme Court entrusted the drafting to an expert
group consisting of leading lawyers and professors, with the principal
drafting responsibilities given to two professors - Charles Clark of
Yale and Edson Sunderland of Michigan. There were no judges on
this committee.
This effort was a striking example of the "expert" method of
producing procedural reform. One goal was somewhat
uncontroversial, of course. That was to produce a single procedural
23. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A
Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HisT. REV. 311 (1988);
D.D. FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS (1949) (collecting scholarly analyses of Field's work a
century after New York adopted the Field Code).
24. McArthur v. Moffet, 128 N.W. 445,446 (Wis. S. Ct. 1910).
25. See28 U.S.C. § 2072.
26. For a very thorough examination of this long legislative evolution, see Stephen
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
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code for all the federal courts to supplant the multitude of state codes
that had previously applied. But the drafters did not limit themselves
to a workmanlike homogenization of the varying state-court
practices. Instead, despite their Establishment credentials, they
undertook aggressive reforms.
Unsatisfied with the rigorous pleading decisions that American
courts had continued to employ even after adoption in many places of
the pleading provisions of the Field Code, the drafters accepted
Clark's urging to adopt very relaxed pleading standards.27 These
reforms - which became known as "notice" pleading - were initially
resisted vigorously by the lower courts, but a 1957 Supreme Court
decision in favor of relaxed pleading2s put those efforts at rebellion
largely to rest.29
Even more strikingly, the drafters of the Federal Rules adopted a
revolutionary package of discovery procedures. Borrowing features
of discovery from a variety of state and foreign practices, Sutherland
cobbled together an overall package that had never had a parallel
anywhere.' Unlike the pleading rules, this package received almost
immediate acceptance in the federal courts.
This experience is also a striking example of top-down
procedural reform. "The original Rules are a strong example of
centralization at the federal level., 31 Not only did the Federal Rules
become a nationwide procedural code for the federal courts, they also
became a model for procedures in many state-court systems. About
half the states adopted procedural codes modeled on the Federal
Rules.32 And in those that did not revise their procedural rules to
correspond to the Federal Rules, the interpretation of the existing
state-court procedures evolved towards the views embodied in the
27. See Richard Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439-40 (1986) (chronicling these
developments). In 2007, the Court retrenched somewhat on the broadcast language in
Conley v. Gibson. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) (holding
that allegations must at least show that claim is "plausible").
28. Conley v. Gibson, 357 U.S. 41 (1957).
29. It must be recognized that the lower courts' enthusiasm for more exacting
pleading requirements in at least some cases has never really gone away. See
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth ofNotice Pleading, 45 Az. L. REV. 987 (2003).
30. See Stephen Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed- The -hstorical Background
of the 1938 Federal DiscoveryRules, 39 Bos. COL. L. REV. 691 (1998).
31. Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1269, 1276 (1997).
32. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts.- A
Survey of State Court Systems of CivilProcedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986).
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Federal Rules. California, for example, continues to have Field Code
pleading rules, requiring fact pleading. Yet the actual decisions of
California state courts embody more relaxed pleading than the
"notice pleading" decisions of federal courts.
In sum, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became "a major
triumph of law reform, 33 that "transformed civil litigation [and] ...
reshaped civil procedure" 3 and therefore were "surely the single most
substantial procedural reform in U.S. history."35  As noted above,
"they have influenced procedural thinking in every court in this
land.., and indeed have become part of the consciousness of
lawyers, judges and scholars who worry about and live with issues of
judicial procedure." ' It is even said that they "became a means of
transforming the modes of judging."'37
For our purposes, the salient point is that this transformation was
accomplished by a top-down initiative from a group of experts
assembled to create new code without any particular directive on
what the new code should be. Perhaps that mode of reform is the one
most likely to produce striking breakthroughs. There is at least some
evidence that the self-confidence of the academics involved in this
project contributed to its pathbreaking nature. Thus the chief
Reporter, Dean Charles Clark (the animating force behind the shift
to "notice pleading"), explained two decades after the rules went into
effect that "reformers must follow their dream and leave
compromises to others. ' '38
The reformers continued their pathbreaking efforts for several
decades after the original adoption of the rules. In the 1960s, they
revised the class action rule in a way that equipped it to become a
vehicle for a variety of innovative litigation initiatives of the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s. 39 Also during the 1960s, they further expanded
33. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues M the
FederalRules of CivilProcedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2237 (1989).
34. Stephen Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
229,233 (1998).
35. Id. at 248.
36. David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16- A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969,1969 (1989).
37. Judith Resnik, Tial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury." Transforming the Meaning
of Article II, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 934 (2000).
38. Charles C. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938-58, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 435,448 (1958).
39. See Richard Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995) (chronicling the broadening use of the American class
action).
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discovery, removing the relatively weak brakes on full-scale discovery
that had been included in the 1938 rules.4"
Altogether, then, the American experience of the mid 20th
century suggests that breakthrough reforms in procedure could be
accomplished by entrusting a group of experts - under academic
leadership - with authority to pursue their dreams. That group was
permitted to operate with quite striking freedom from oversight.
Indeed, for a time it evidently insisted that its work remain entirely
secret until its completed product was ready for public view.41
But it is at least debatable whether this reform arrangement was
the principal explanation for the breakthroughs that occurred. Other
changes in society - economic and political - reinforced the direction
in which the procedural reforms were moving. Increasingly, litigation
became the agent for implementing public norms at the initiative of
private litigants, which was not something that the rulemakers of the
1930s necessarily foresaw.42 This distinctively American substitute for
the bureaucratic enforcement of public norms found in most other
industrialized nations may have reached its ideal implementation
through the combination of lax pleading standards and broad
discovery, which enabled the citizenry to enforce the norms
themselves through lawsuits.43 Thus, it came to be that, in America,
broad discovery was viewed as almost a constitutional entitlement of
litigants" and recalibration of that discovery as imperiling the
40. See Richard Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 Bos. COL. L. REV. 747
(1998) (describing the broadening of discovery through 1970).
41. See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75
JUDICATURE 161, 164 (1991) (stating that the Advisory Committee Reporter during the
1960s "was instructed to keep his work entirely under wraps until the committee was
prepared to make a recommendation").
42. Thus, Professor Hazard observes that "[t]his relationship between civil justice
and social justice was not anticipated in 1930. The social wrongs whose remediation is
assisted by the Federal Rules in the present era had not then appeared in the civil
litigation agenda." Hazard, supra note 33, at 2246.
43. This is the explanation given by an American political scientist for reliance on
private litigation in this country:
American adversarial legalism, therefore, can be viewed as arising from a
fundamental tension between two powerful elements: first, a political culture
(or set of popular attitudes) that expects and demands comprehensive
governmental protections from serious harm, injustice and environmental
dangers - and hence a powerful, activist government - and, second, as set of
governmental structures that reflect mistrust of a concentrated power and
hence that limit and fragment political and governmental authority.
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 15 (2001).
44. Geoffrey C. Hazard, From Whom No Secrets Are Kept, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1665,
1694 (1998) ("Broad discovery is not a mere procedural tool. Rather it has become, at
[Vol. 31:1
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enforcement of mandates from Congress.45  So attributing the
dramatic nature of these reforms entirely to the mode used to
accomplish them seems misguided.
IV. The New Reality of American Procedural Reform
The days of breakthrough reforms from the expert group is over
in America. It may be that aggressive reform has been reborn in
England with the work of Lord Woolf. Lord Woolf's reforms were
enshrined in the new Civil Procedure Rules adopted in 1998. In
Professor Zuckerman's words, these rules "transformed English civil
procedure" by making "radical departures" leading to a "new
procedural code." 46  Professor Andrews is similarly emphatic,
referring to "Lord Woolf's bulldozers., 47  To some extent, these
bulldozers consciously followed an American trail; the new English
rules embrace judicial management of litigation that resembles the
American model. But the emerging English reality seems to move
beyond the American model in a number of ways. For our purposes,
the key point is that Lord Woolf's dramatic reform of the entire
English system of civil litigation stands in stark contrast to the
relatively halting activity of the American rulemakers in the same
period.
A. Rulemakers Stop Acting as a Band of Experts
In the United States, it might be said that the demise of the old
model was a product of its success. By the 1970s, a clamor arose to
curtail the liberality of the procedural model produced in the pervious
35 years for reform. In 1976, a conference attended by the Chief
Justice upbraided broad discovery and lax pleading for producing a
litigation outburst that had harmful results. '8 At much the same time,
the 1966 expansion of the class action was provoking vigorous attack
on that procedural device.49
least in our era, a procedural institution perhaps of virtually constitutional foundation.").
45. Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1997) ("Calibration of
discovery is calibration of the level of enforcement of social policy set by Congress.").
46. Zuckerman, supra note 13, at 1.
47. Andrews, supra note 12, at ix.
48. See Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction With The Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79-246
(1976).
49. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
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Meanwhile, the whole enterprise of rulemaking by experts had
come under attack. In the late 1960s, the same model had been
adopted to develop a set of evidence rules for the federal courts. As
with the work on the civil procedure rules in the 1930s, this new
project was assigned to an expert committee under the leadership of
an academic Reporter. When offered for adoption, that set of rules
contained a number of controversial elements. Some of its provisions
irritated the Department of Justice, the federal prosecutorial agency.
Its privilege provisions contained features viewed as sins of
commission and of omission. The most pertinent sin of omission was
deleting the venerable doctor-patient privilege, which the framers of
the evidence rules concluded no longer served a purpose. The
American Medical Association, a powerful lobby, thought otherwise.
These rulemakers' most pertinent sin of commission was including a
vigorous executive privilege rule. These rules arrived in Congress at
the height the Watergate scandal (in which President Nixon relied
heavily on executive privilege to resist inquiries by Congress) so
something that seemed to fortify Nixon's arguments was not received
with open arms. The consequence was that Congress refused to
permit the evidence rules to go into effect and rewrote many of them,
ultimately adopting the evidence rules as a statute. Congress also
directed that no privilege rules could thereafter be adopted through
the rulemaking process.0 It seemed that there was a shift toward
legislative procedural reform.
To some academic eyes, this development produced a crisis.
Professor Friedenthal feared the loss of rulemaking as "a means of
obtaining meaningful and necessary reform of antiquated procedural
rules that can otherwise be altered only through legislation" because
such improvements could not be obtained through legislation "in the
face of opposition from trial attorneys.,
51
These developments certainly produced a change in the mode of
activity by the rulemakers. Contrary to the earlier secrecy of their
activities, they began courting public input. In 1978, for the first time,
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules held public hearings on
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv. 664 (1979) (describing the
upsurge of opposition of aggressive use of the class action).
50. See28 U.S.C. § 2074(b).
51. Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A
Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 673, 673-74 (1975). For a similar comment on
the English experience, see supra note 8.
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proposed rule amendments.52  And the makeup of the rules
committee itself began to change. In the 1930s, there had been no
judges on the committee that drafted the original Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, but by the 1980s and 1990s, the committee was
dominated by judges. Thus, it came in a sense to include aspects of
another model of reform-reform by judges, albeit judges specially
deputized to pursue these reforms in a committee setting.
Congress began to assert itself regarding rulemaking also. In
1988, it revised the Rules Enabling Act to require that the rules
committee conduct all their business in public, and requiring both
public hearings and public commentary on any proposed changes to
rules.53 And Congress on occasion acted to change provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without deferring to or even
awaiting the official rulemakers. In 2007, the Supreme Court
adopted a stringent standard for pleading under the PSLRA.55
But the rulemakers were not entirely cowed by these
developments. To the contrary, they undertook a number of
aggressive rule changes that were smoothly adopted. In 1983, they
adopted a new discovery provision that required judges to refuse
discovery in situations in which it was disproportionate. 6 At the time,
the academic Reporter for the rulemaking committee described this
change as producing "a 180 degree shift" in the orientation toward
broad discovery. 7 But for a long time, this rule change seemed to
produce no actual change in practice. More dramatic effects followed
the adoption in 1993 of a requirement that all expert witnesses
provide detailed written reports on pain of possibly being denied
52. See Marcus, supra note 40, at 758 n.58.
53. See28 U.S.C. § 2073.
54. A prime example is the amendment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 in 1988 to broaden the
classes of people who could perform physical or mental examinations. Reportedly, this
change was made at the behest of a powerful judge who had a relative who was not
authorized to conduct such examinations under the old rule but was authorized under
the amended Rule. See Carrington, supra note 41, at 165. Eventually, the rulesmakers
further changed the rule to expand the classes of people who could perform
examinations.
55. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues and Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007)
(holding that, to qualify as "strong" under the statute, a complaint must set forth
allegations that make an inference of scienter "at least as compelling or reasonable as
any opposing inference of nonfraudlent intent").
56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
57. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 32-33 (1984).
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leave to testify at trial. 8 That change engendered no controversy at
the time it was enacted, but has produced a very large number of
decisions applying its provisions. 9
Other changes provoked great controversy. In 1983, the
rulesmakers responded to concerns about abuse of litigation by
fortifying Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
makes a lawyer's signature on a paper filed in court a certification of
its bona fides. This amendment produced a huge reaction in short
order; by 1988 a prominent judge reported that "Rule 11 has become
a significant factor in civil litigation, with an impact that has likely
exceeded its drafters' expectations. "' There was very broad concern
that the rule was being used disproportionately frequently against
civil rights plaintiffs and skewing the stakes and results of civil
litigation. The Advisory Committee responded by issuing an
unprecedented "call" for commentary on Rule 11,6' and later
proposing amendments to soften the rule's impact. Even those
changes provoked objections; Justice Scalia of the Supreme Court
dissented from the change on the ground that the amendments
"would render the rule toothless." 6
An even greater brouhaha erupted in 1993 when the rulemakers
tried to introduce a somewhat dramatic new concept into the
discovery arena - that litigants should be required at the outset of
litigation to turn over certain "core" materials without awaiting a
formal discovery request. This might not seem a particularly
revolutionary concept, since the Supreme Court had ruled 30 years
before that prosecutors had such a duty in regard to exculpatory
material they obtained. 63 And introducing disclosure might usher in a
new age in which heavy reliance on formal discovery could abate,64
perhaps resembling English practices. But the proposal provoked "a
58. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B); 37(c)(1).
59. See 8 C. Wright, A. Miller & R. Marcus, Fed. Prac. & Pro. § 2031.1; 8A id. §
2289.1 (2d ed. 1994; 2007 pkt pt).
60. William Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (1988).
61. Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990).
62. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring the prosecution to provide
the defendant with any exculpatory material it obtains).
64. See Wauchop v. Domino's, 143 F.R.D. 199, 200 (N.D. Ind. 1992) ("Some
observers of civil litigation believe that discovery rights will be taken from lawyers within
the next decade or two, to be replaced by a system of standard disclosures.").
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flood of objections unprecedented in fifty plus years of rulemaking. ' '65
After some hesitation, the rulemakers proceeded with a revised initial
disclosure rule that permitted individual courts to opt out of the new
requirement, but even that provoked a dissent from Justice Scalia,
who opined that it conflicted with the duties of an American lawyer
never to turn over anything that might harm the client without a
proper demand from the other side.' Seven years later, the
disclosure obligation was further limited, but made nationally binding
over the anguished objections of federal district judges who wanted to
retain their local arrangements rather than defer to directives from
Washington.67
Over this time, the rulemakers have become more tentative
about their authority to make dramatic changes. At the same time,
their top-down model has been weakened. In part that has been due
to legislation, as described below. But beyond that, the rulemakers
have come increasingly to embrace national procedural reforms based
on local innovations. The most significant example of that activity is
the case management movement, which originated in a number of
metropolitan district courts in the 1960s and 1970s and was enshrined
in the national rules in 1983. Other examples point up the relative
weakness of the national set of rules. In a number of instances, local
provisions that could well be described as impermissible because they
deviated from the national rules became the basis for changing the
national rules themselves.
At the same time, another feature of rulemaking has emerged
that might flow from the model of judge-made procedure outlined in
Part II - an increased emphasis on leaving matters to the discretion of
judges. One could argue that judges would prefer rules that simply -
leave procedural decisions up to their sense of fairness. And to a
65. Ann Pelham, Judges Make Ouite a Discovery: Litigators Erupt, Kill Plan to
Reform Federal CivilRules, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16,1992, at 1.
66. Justice Scalia's points were as follows:
The proposed new regime does not fit comfortably within the American
judicial system, which relies on adversarial litigation to develop the facts
before a neutral decision maker. By placing upon lawyers the obligation to
disclose information damaging to their clients - on their own initiative, and
in a context where the lines between what must be disclosed and what need
not be disclosed are not clear but require the exercise of considerable
judgment - the new Rule would place intolerable strain upon lawyers'
ethical duty to represent their clients and not to assist the opposing side.
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 511 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
67. For a sampling of those reactions, see Marcus, supra note 1, at 915.
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considerable extent, recent rulemaking has come to rely on judicial
discretion in lieu of spelling out in the rule exactly how the issues
involved should be handled. 6 But the matters so handled in most
instances are inherently subject to individual calibration, such as the
occasion for exceeding the numerical limits now imposed on certain
forms of discovery, or the amount of time to be allowed for various
pretrial preparatory activities in individual cases.
Altogether, then, the expert, top-down model of rulemaking
reform that seemed so vital in America in the middle of the 20th
century has been replaced by a more cautious approach. This is not a
bad thing; repeated revolutionary changes are likely to be
counterproductive, and some constraint on the high-water version of
freewheeling American litigation that existed in the 1970s seems
entirely warranted, particularly where it is implemented by judges
who more actively supervise the use of the litigation machine they
preside over.6 9 At the same time, the initiative for aggressive reform
seems to have shifted to Congress.
B. An Emboldened Congress Experiments With Procedural
Reform
For most of its existence, Congress took almost no interest in
procedural reform. For a century and a half, it directed that federal
judges apply state procedures without taking much interest in what
those procedures were. In 1934, it adopted the Rules Enabling Act,
which delegated authority to the Supreme Court to promulgate
nationwide rules of procedure for federal courts. Although it
directed that these rules could not alter "substantive" rights, it gave
no significant consideration to what the rules might contain. Then,
for about forty years under the Rules Enabling Act regime it deferred
to the procedural reforms produced through the centralized, expert,
and secretive committee method.
That indifference has disappeared. In recent years, members of
Congress have regularly introduced legislation to change the rules, or
to provide directives by statute for matters governed by rule. For
some, this implies that the rulemakers are right to circumscribe their
activities; one scholar has argued that "the increasing reach of
68. See Richard Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1561 (2003).
69. For an exploration of these issues, see Richard Marcus, Reiningin the American
Lawyer: The New Role of American Judges, 27 HAST. INT'L & COMPAR. L. REv. 3
(2003).
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Congress' procedural legislation... expand[s] the scope of matters to
be considered 'substantive' within the meaning of the [Rules
Enabling Act]." 70  Whether there should be some limit on the
authority of Congress to legislate matters of procedure might be
debated; some urge that the Congress should respect the rulemaking
process and refrain from legislating about procedure unless invited to
do so by the rulemakers. But the reality is that legislative initiative
has expanded, and the possibility of dramatic change by legislation
now seems more pronounced than the prospect of such change by
rulemaking. The three experiences described below, however, show
also that those who seek dramatic procedural breakthroughs via
legislation are often disappointed, and sometimes confounded by
features of what is enacted.
i. The Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA)
In 1990, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA).7'
This legislation was aimed at curtailing the cost and delay of civil
litigation in the U.S. It directed each of the 94 U.S. district courts in
the nation to convene an advisory group to design procedures for the
district to achieve these objectives, thus embracing via nationwide
legislation a bottom-up approach to procedural reform. It also
directed these local groups to consider certain principles of reform,
chief among them judicial management of litigation. At least in part,
the legislation signified dissatisfaction with the rulemaking process.
The principal aide to the bill's chief sponsor in the Senate, for
example, decried the "near mystical reverence of the rulemaking
authority exercised by the Judicial Conference.
7
1
Taken to its full extent, this legislative initiative could have had a
profound impact on procedural reform in the United States. In the
words of Prof. Mullenix, Congress was "fomenting a nationwide
procedural revolution that is probably unparalleled since the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."73  Some
suggested that the Federal Rules themselves were no constraint on
the reform initiatives of local advisory groups acting pursuant to the
70. Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (In the Rules Enabling Act)
More Seiously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47 (1998).
71. 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
72. Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United" The Civil Justice Refonm Act of 1990, 54 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 117 (1991).
73. Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 375,377 (1992).
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statute, but gradually this view was deflated.74 Despite misgivings, it
seems that the process "fostered a healthy dialogue between the
bench and bar."75 Overall, it is probably fair to say that the work
product of the local advisory groups was rather modest.76 In general,
these local groups were either headed by judges, or at least under the
control of members of the local bar. They were not devices by which
the general population was loosed to revise the procedural system.
Due to this structural reality, these local groups were likely to be
cautious in their changes.
Moreover, this chapter closed more with a whimper than a bang.
Congress also directed that the CJRA be closely studied, and a very
thorough effort was undertaken by the Rand Corporation.77 This
study produced very modest conclusions about the value of the case
management reforms introduced by local groups empowered by the
CJRA. Although this judicial activity appeared to produce a
significant reduction in the duration of litigation, it also seemed to
increase the cost of litigation by forcing parties in some cases to do
more in a short time frame than they would have done without being
impelled toward action by judicial time limits. The only practice the
Rand study would endorse was imposition of a short time for
completion of discovery, which it found accelerated the completion of
litigation without increasing its cost. Even this conclusion was
challenged by a later study by the Federal Judicial Center.8
When Congress adopted the CJRA, it included a "sunset"
provision directing that the Act would cease to apply after seven
years, and the CJRA advisory groups thus retired into the sunset in
1997, and the legislation lapsed. It had few enduring effects. To a
small extent, the later amendment of the initial disclosure provisions
of the Federal Rules to eliminate local opt-out provisions was based
74. See Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994) (demonstrating that there was no support in the legislative
history of the Act to support suspension of the Federal Rules).
75. Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil Justice Reform Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
115, 122 (1993).
76. See generally Richard Marcus, OfBabies and Bathwater, 59 BROOKLYN L. REV.
761,800-05 (1993).
77. See JAMES S. KAKALIK, ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM Acr (1997).
78. See T. WILLGING, J. SHAPPARD, D. STIENSTRA & D. MILETICH, DISCOVERY
AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 52-55 (1997)
(finding no substantial relationship between discovery cutoffs and cost or duration of
litigation).
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on insights from the CRA experiment.79 Perhaps the overall
experience of local procedural activism has paid some dividends. But
a decade after this experiment ended little more remains of what was
put in place by the CJRA.
As a model for procedural reform of the "bottom-up" variety,
and also as a variant of the "expert" panel technique, then, the CJRA
is extremely inconclusive. But it was not a very vibrant effort in
either sense, given the short duration and ambiguous powers of the
local reformers.
A The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)
As noted above, by the 1970s a number of critics in the U.S. had
focused on the interaction of relaxed pleading and broad discovery in
enabling some kinds of suits. The idea of a "strike suit" had been
around for quite a while, but it gained new currency in that period.
And possibly the most prominent example of strike suits from the
1980s and early 1990s was the securities fraud class action. Some
thought that these suits were routine responses to a fall in stock
prices, whatever the actual reason for the fall in prices. To some
extent, the strengthening of Rule 11 should have responded to these
concerns, but that fortification of Rule 11 was partially retracted by
amendments in 1993. At the same time, the growing importance of
high-tech companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley, seemed to
present more and more vibrant opportunities for aggressive litigation
brought in hopes of rich settlements by lawyers who did not have
substantial concerns about the merits of the claims they were
asserting.
Whatever the merit of these criticisms as perceived by
academics,8 they came to have significant political force and in 1995
79. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67 for discussion of the initial disclosure
controversy.
80. Thus, Professor Alexander argued that in securities fraud suits the merits of the
case seemed to have no significant bearing on the amount of settlements, and that all
cases settled. Although one would think that the settlement amount would vary
according to the merits, she found that such suits were invariably settled for about the
same percentage of the alleged loss, a circumstance she attributed to risk aversion among
defendants, the availability of insurance to fund settlements, and the unwillingness of
plaintiff lawyers to risk a trial. "With adjudication before trial unavailable as a practical
matter and adjudication at trial a virtually unthinkable alternative, settlement becomes a
foregone conclusion." Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities C7ass Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 567 (1991). For a
contrasting view, see Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REv. 438
(1994) (questioning Alexander's conclusions).
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Congress adopted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) to respond to the criticisms. President Clinton vetoed the
PSLRA, but Congress re-passed the bill over his veto with great
alacrity.
To a considerable extent, the PSLRA addressed substantive
matters of securities law about such matters as liability for projections
of business success. But central features of the legislation ran counter
to the permissive provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, rather than permitting "notice" pleading, which even the
Federal Rules abjured for fraud cases,"' the statute requires that
complaints contain great specificity and "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
[fraudulent intent]."" Taking account of the importance of discovery,
it also provides that a plaintiff can have no discovery until the
complaint had survived a motion to dismiss under the stringent
pleading standards,83 providing that the federal court could stay
discovery efforts in parallel state-court litigation that might
"circumvent" the stay in federal court.8
In this way, the PSLRA sought to substitute for the Federal
Rules' attitude toward initiating a lawsuit a view more symptomatic
of the rest of the world. It thus represented a dramatic shift in
general attitude from the breakthroughs of the Federal Rules sixty
years before, accomplished through a highly-political legislative effort
rather than the "expert" method used to create the Federal Rules'
breakthrough in the first place.
The lower courts have been vigorous in enforcing the PSLRA's
requirements. Although some courts that had already been quite
demanding in assessing complaints thought that their former
demanding attitude was sufficient, others that had been permissive
have taken the Act to demand stringency.85 A particular bone of
contention has been whether the plaintiff must name all sources of
information - including insiders in the company - that form the basis
for allegations in the complaint. The wrangling over these issues has
81. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring that allegations of fraud be made with
particularity).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) ("all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed
during the pendency of any motion to dismiss").
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(D).
85. The leading example is In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., Securities Litigation, 183
F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
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produced a wealth of new caselaw.6 The lower courts have also been
vigilant in preventing judges from permitting discovery before the
complaint survives an attack based on the stringent new pleading
requirements.87
Some foresaw a dramatic decline in the effectiveness of private
enforcement of the securities laws as a result:
[T]he Reform Act is likely to allow only the more flagrant and
obvious cases of securities fraud to proceed past a motion to
dismiss, while being overinclusive in its elimination of cases where
it is more difficult to identify, and therefore to plead, fraud.
Presumably, the [federal Securities and Exchange Commission],
with its limited resources, pursues the flagrant and obvious cases of
securities fraud. Arguably, however, the more difficult to identify
frauds are precisely the ones that the plaintiffs who function as
private attorneys general pursue.... Because the plaintiffs lack
access to the information the Reform Act requires them to plead at
the motion-to-dismiss stage, however, the strict application of the
heightened-pleading standard is likely to result in unredressed
fraud.88
At the same time, one could see a silver lining in the new
requirements for plaintiffs:
Though lax pleading requirements made the nuisance value of a
suit much more difficult to address through pretrial motions, it
must also be understood that the Reform Act's heightened
pleading standard credentials suits that survive pretrial motions so
that [they] will have greater settlement value than such suits had on
average before the Reform Act.... [C]ounsel should feel more
confident in the case after satisfying the new pleading requirements
than the counsel who had previously had to know less and plead
less to withstand a challenge to the pleadings.89
As might be expected from these diverse comments, the actual
impact of the PSLRA was hard to gauge. Although some may have
86. See 2 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIEs LAW HANDBOOK § 29 (2004 ed.)
(providing over 140 pages of analysis of the interpretation of the PSLRA' pleading
standards).
87. See SG Cowen Securities Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 189 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the district court may not permit discovery that will enable plaintiffs to
uncover fats sufficient to satisfy the Act's pleading requirements).
88. Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the
Effect of the PSLRA's Internal-information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76
WASH. U. L. REv. 537,564 (1998).
89. James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIz. L.
REV. 497,520 (1997).
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expected that there would be a dramatic decline in the frequency of
securities fraud suits, there was a mild decline followed by an
increase. And the settlement value of suits soared in the early 21st
century,9° although there has been a drop-off recently.9 But the
probable reason for these results is not that the procedural reforms
had no effect so much as that the changing economic times and the
uncovering of enormous frauds perpetrated in the frenetic years of
the technology boom meant that there was much more to sue about
and larger damages to collect. Nonetheless, this result shows that
even a dramatic procedural reform may not have a dramatic real-life
effect.
ii.i The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)
Besides lax pleading and broad discovery, the other procedural
innovation introduced by the Federal Rules that became a bane to
corporate America was the class action. Although defendants began
in the 1980s to employ the class action to resolve large number of
mass claims with some frequency, the use of the device in consumer-
type situations drew growing criticism. This criticism focused
particularly on state-court class actions that asserted claims on behalf
of nationwide classes, or classes made up of claimants from many
states. In part, this was a result of the likely application of the law of
the forum state to transactions happening elsewhere, where one could
argue that those engaged in transactions in other states had no
meaningful way to foresee that their conduct would be measured by
the standards of the state in which the suit was filed.9 But a greater
90. See, e.g., Lindsay Fortado, Banner Year for Securities Class Action Settlements,
Nat. L.J., March 14, 2005, at 4 (reporting that in 2004 settlement amounts in securities
fraud class actions hit a record total of $5.5 billion); Warren R. Stem & Sarah E.
McCallum, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Ten Years After, 38 REV. SEC.
& COMMOD. REG. 89, 94 (2005) ("on an annual basis, more cases have been filed after
the Act than before"); Michael Perillo, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Work., 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 913 (2003).
91. In 2006, securities class action filings fell off, and some said that the Sarbanes
Oxley legislation had caused companies to exercise greater care in reporting their
financial results. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Legal Bear- Stock Class-Action Market,
Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at A15. Others cautioned, however, that the annual drop
seemed cyclical, meaning that the level of filings would rise again. See Pamela A.
MacLean, Class Action Decline in '06May Not be a Trend, Nat. L.J., Jan. 8, 2007, at 6.
92. A leading example was Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d
1241 (INI. Ct. App. 2001), in which the trial court in Madison County Illinois - often
labeled a "plaintiffs' paradise" - certified a nationwide class of insureds challenging State
Farm's practice of saving money on repairs by specifying use of replacement parts that
were cheaper than the replacement parts produced by the manufacturer. The trial court
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concern was that plaintiff lawyers would carefully file such
nationwide class actions in a state court in a county that was highly
favorable to class action plaintiffs. These localities became known as
"plaintiffs' paradise." On occasion it seemed that there was a close
relationship between the elected state-court judges in these localities
and members of the plaintiffs' bar, who were major contributors to
these judges' campaigns. Because it was often possible to file such a
class action wherever any member of the class resided, these cases
came to offer what was known as "universal venue," giving plaintiff
lawyers easy access to plaintiffs' paradise jurisdictions.
The favored solution to this problem, from the defense
perspective, was to have the cases heard by federal courts. At first
blush, this may seem odd. The Federal Rules, after all, were the
source of the expansion of class action practice due to the rulemakers'
1966 amendment of the class action rule. And the relaxed pleading
and broad discovery features of American litigation were also derived
from the Federal Rules breakthrough reforms. But federal judges are
not only part of the nationwide federal judicial system, they are
appointed for life and do not stand for election. Beyond that, there
may have been some feeling that federal judges - most of them
appointed by Republican presidents - would be more sympathetic to
defendants' concerns than some state-court judges. And the federal
rules concerning what evidence could be used in court - particularly
expert evidence - may have been viewed as more favorable by
defendants. As a consequence, plaintiff lawyers had attempted to
configure their suits to prevent them from being removed to federal
court, often by making sure there was a local defendant who would
defeat diversity of citizenship, which was required for cases based on
state law to be in federal court.
At the same time, it is important to note that the possibility of
aggressive state-court measures in class actions contained the
possibility of disrupting the operation of the federal-court systems.
There were certainly examples of federal class action proceedings
that had seemingly been undermined by conflicting rulings by state-
court judges in competing class actions. Sometimes, after a federal
judge decided that class certification should not be allowed, a state-
court judge would permit a class action in virtually identical
applied Illinois consumer law to the entire nationwide class even though State Farm's
practice was reportedly legal, or even required by law, in a number of other states. The
suit initially produced a judgment for more than $1 billion, which was reversed on
appeal.
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circumstances. Similarly, on occasion a state-court judge would
approve a proposed class-action settlement that a federal judge had
earlier found inadequate or unfair. These problems had caused the
federal rulemakers to try to devise rule amendments that would
insulate federal class-action proceedings against such disruption, but
eventually it seemed that these efforts went beyond the rulemakers'
authority. One possible solution would be to modify removal
jurisdiction and expand the authority of federal courts to enjoin state-
court actions. But under the Rules Enabling Act the federal
rulemakers could not make such changes. As a result, they
announced that some changes by Congress could be helpful in
addressing the problems they were unable to solve themselves. 93
The solution proposed in Congress was the Class Action Fairness
Act (CAFA), signed into law in early 2005 and designed to permit
more class actions to be filed in or removed to federal court. At the
same time, an effort was made to guard against removal of class
actions primarily of interest to the state in which they were filed.
There are certainly a number of technical issues to raise with these
provisions,94 but for our purposes it may be enough to conclude
generally that "it seems unlikely that many class actions can be
crafted by class action attorneys to stay in state courts."95 There was
intense opposition to this bill from certain plaintiff interests, and this
conclusion about the effect of the Act seems to mean that the
defendant interests largely achieved their goal.
But CAFA is a mixed bag from the perspective of defense
interests. Along with the jurisdictional change, the Act also includes
provisions about scrutiny of settlements that may inhibit some deals
that defendants may wish to make. In recent years, some consumer
class actions have been resolved by what are called "coupon
settlements" - defendant provides class members with a coupon good
for a discount on further purchases of the product or service that gave
rise to the suit in the first place. That is a painless (even profitable,
93. See letter from Leonidas Ralph Meacham, Sec'y, Judicial Conf. of the United
States, to Orrin G. Hatch, Chair, Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate (March
26,2003), reprintedin 149 CONG. REC. S12876-77 (daily ed., Oct. 20,2003).
94. For a discussion of these issues, see Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions after the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TULANE L. REV. 1593 (2006). The focus is on such
matters as how one determines whether more than two-thirds of the class members are
from the forum state, and how one decides whether a "primary defendant" is "local."
For a discussion of the statute's jurisdictional policy, see Richard Marcus, Assessing
CAFA's Stated JurisdictionalPoicy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
95. See Sherman, supra note 94, at 1597.
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perhaps) way for defendants to settle cases. CAFA frowns on coupon
settlements. A court may approve a coupon settlement only on
finding after a hearing that it is adequate. 96  Perhaps more
significantly, the attorney's fee for the lawyers who brought the suit
may only be based on the value of the coupons that members of the
class actually redeem, not all coupons that are granted to the class.'
Since one objection to coupon settlements is that the coupons are
often of little or no value to the class members, this could be a telling
change.
In addition, CAFA requires that local or state authorities be
notified of any proposed settlement and allowed to object on behalf
of residents of their states.98 This requirement is at least a headache
for settling parties, since the Act delays approval of any settlement
until 90 days have elapsed after the notice is given. It also raises the
possibility that a state attorney general or other official - perhaps
motivated in part by the desire to gain favorable publicity - can
object, thereby holding up the approval of the settlement and perhaps
causing the court to disapprove it. Although there is little early
indication that state attorneys general are using this authority,' the
introduction of this wild card hardly furthers the defense agenda.
And it is not clear that the advantages defense interests sought to
obtain from having cases in federal rather than state court will turn
out often to be very valuable. Unless federal judges are more
favorable to defense interests than state-court judges, the Act seems
an ambivalent blessing for defendants. The overall effect of the Act
is still unknown, but early returns suggest that it will have a limited
effect on outcomes. The Federal Judicial Center undertook
comparative research on state and federal court handling of class
actions to try to discern how a shift to federal court would change
outcomes. The results make CAFA's likely effects seem very modest:
Our data, however, lend little support to the view that state and
federal courts differ greatly in how they resolve class actions. For
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1715. See Laurens Walker, The Consumer Class Action Bill of
Rights: A Policy and Political MIstake, 58 HAST. L. J. 849 (2007) (criticizing requirement
of notice to state attorneys general).
99. See Peter Geier, State AGsEschew CAFA Review, Nat. L., Oct. 23, 2006, at 5
(reporting that there has been only one instance in which a state attorney general made
use of the opportunity to object that CAFA provides). But see Julie Kay, Miami Judge
Rejects Settlement in Sharper Image Class Action, S.F. Recorder, Oct. 15, 2007
(reporting that 36 state attorneys general had opposed proposed settlement).
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example, state and federal courts were equally unlikely to certify
cases filed as class actions. Both state and federal courts certified
classes in fewer than one in four cases filed as class actions.
Although state courts approved settlements awarding more money
to the class than did federal courts, that difference was a product of
the size of the class; individual class members on average were
awarded more from settlements in federal courts than in state
courts.1°°
CAFA has been called "the most significant change in class
action practice since the federal class action rule was amended in
1966, ' ' 1° ' and there was certainly a very loud controversy about it
when it was adopted. Nonetheless, it seems as though this procedural
reform will produce very modest effects.
V. Reflecting On the Importance of Modes of
Procedural Reform
All in all, this brief canvas of U.S. procedural reform indicates
that the mode for accomplishing it has only modest importance. The
strongest argument for treating the mode of reform as highly
important is the original adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938. That
breakthrough event is consistent with what one might expect from a
band of technocratic "experts" given a relatively free hand to devise a
new procedural arrangement. Accepting that characterization,
however, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the mode of
reform was a critical component in the extent of reform. Some
suggest that a key aspect of that reform effort was that it cam during
America's New Deal under President Franklin Roosevelt in the
1930s, a time when many features of American life were first subject
to direction by "expert" groups convened by the federal government.
The procedural reforms can be viewed as simply another example of
that more general phenomenon.'O° And the magnitude of those
reforms could be viewed as resulting as much from social and political
conditions of the period as from the method by which they were
designed.
Other aspects of U.S. experience are consistent with the typology
100. Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in
Class Action Litigation. What Difference Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 591,
599 (2006). Of more than 600 cases on which the researchers obtained information, for
example, "[n]o judge rejected a class settlement." Id. at 605.
101. Sherman, supra note 94, at 1593.
102. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 31.
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at the outset. Legislative development of codes - particularly in state
legislatures - has often included myriad features serving the desires of
special interests. The federal rulemaking apparatus, now dominated
by judges does show a tendency to enhance judicial discretion, but it
generally is not responsive to special interests.
But the generalizations are too broad. The federal rulemakers
continue to make some aggressive changes, although their efforts with
Rule 11 in 1983 and with initial disclosure in 1993 may have produced
more harm to the rulemaking effort than help to the judicial system.
Congress, meanwhile, has sometimes been something of a wild card.
The adoption of the CJRA certainly injected an unexpected and
potentially centrifugal ingredient into the national rules process by
licensing 94 local reform bodies. The PSLRA represented, at its
heart, a rejection of two major thrusts of the Federal Rules
breakthrough - relaxed pleading and broad discovery - but its effects
have not been cataclysmic in the area where it applies, and it only
applies to a very small (though important) fraction of federal court
litigation. The more recent adoption of CAFA, while it provoked
huge amounts of bombast, seems unlikely to have what observers
from outside the United States would call a major effect on handling
of class actions. And it responded in a sense to an endorsement from
the rulesmakers for reforms like these to solve problems they had not
been able to solve by rule amendment.
A tentative conclusion, therefore, is that the U.S. experience
offers little support for the view that America's remarkable
procedural features result from its peculiar methods of achieving
procedural reform. This part therefore offers some more general
reactions concerning procedural reform that seem relevant without
regard to the mode of reform. This tentative conclusion can be
amplified with consideration of recent reform efforts in England,
Germany, and Japan. °3
One seeming constant is the urge to reform. This urge appears
to persist even when there is no crisis with the way things are. We are
told, for example, that some say that German civil justice is working
too well, and that "its relatively low cost and high efficiency are
actually fostering litigation and causing citizens to resort too readily
103. For a recent consideration of the insights to be gleaned for an American from
study of the procedural arrangements of these countries, see Richard Marcus, Putting
American Procedural Exceptiona'sm Into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709
(2005).
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to the courts."' ° Yet we are also told that German reforms adopted
in 2002 are "the single most important revision since the original
[code] of 1877," and that this change is designed to achieve "a
fundamental reform" of the code.05  In particular, the German
introduction of an obligation to produce documents has been called
"close to revolutionary."' 06
That one might initiate a procedural revolution without a
procedural crisis is a striking notion. As I have noted elsewhere, the
American experience is that crisis rhetoric is frequently employed to
justify reform efforts." Certainly the recent English experience flows
from a perceived crisis. Lord Woolf's initial report catalogued
manifold serious and harmful problems of English procedure that
could undercut English prominence in commercial matters.'08 That
crisis explains the willingness of the English to undertake the
revolutionary changes embodied in the CPR. In Japan, in contrast,
there seems to be a relatively constant concern about the need to
improve the procedural system but no evidence of crisis. If anything,
the greatest difficulty presented in Japan is that the legal profession
has until recently been undervalued, and the judiciary has been too
insulated from the tasks of actual lawyers. Both financial changes and
the development of a new form of legal education in Japan (modeled
on American post-graduate law schools) may alleviate that concern.
In the United States also, the atmosphere of crisis seems often to
be overstated. For example, one hears repeatedly that American
discovery is out of control and inflicts disproportionate costs on
litigants. Yet careful studies of discovery in American courts do not
support those assertions. In 1997 the Federal Judicial Center did a
study of discovery in recently-closed cases and found that the median
cost of discovery was about 50% of the total litigation cost and about
3% of the amount at stake in the litigation. Most surveyed lawyers
thought that the amount of discovery in their cases was about right."°
A 1992 study of five state courts by the National Center for State
104. PETER L. MURRAY& ROLFSTURNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 19 (2004).
105. Gerhard Walter, The German Civil Procedure Reform Act 2002: Much Ado
About Nothing?, in THE REFORMS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECnVE 67,72 (N. Trocker & V. Varano, eds.).
106. Id. at 76.
107. See Marcus, supra note 76, at 762-67 (describing the crisis mentality attending
American reform efforts).
108. SeegenerallyLord Woolf s Access to Justice: Interim Report (1995).
109. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empiical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
Practice Under the 1993 FederalRule Amendments, 39 Bos. COL. L. REV. 525 (1998).
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Courts made similar findings." ° To some extent, the rest of the world
might discount these studies (which relied on surveys of lawyers) on
the ground that American lawyers are so inured to discovery that
their opinions are reliable. But the complaints about a discovery
crisis also come from American lawyers, so that objection loses some
force.
Indeed, some objections - whether phrased in crisis terms or not
- seem almost eternal. One is delay. A recent book, for example, is
devoted entirely to delay in civil litigation.11' In the United States,
concerns about delay have persisted for years and prompted major
efforts to increase the pace of litigation."2 The enduring question,
however, is how one determines what constitutes delay. Litigation is
a complicated and difficult undertaking. There is much reason to
suspect that most disputes do not reach court in the United States,
despite its reputation for litigiousness, so one would think the same is
true in other countries. In Japan, for example, we have been told that
litigation has been viewed as a last resort, so the winnowing effect of
nonlitigation resolution should be stronger and the cases that get to
court more contentious. In Germany, as noted above, there is a
concern that it is too easy to get a case into court, but 1996 statistics
show that nearly half of cases filed in local courts were disposed of
within three months of filing."3
How then to approach concerns about delay? The right starting
point, it would seem, is some consideration of the amount of effort
and time needed to accomplish the tasks needed to reach a resolution.
The simpler and more abbreviated those tasks, the stronger the
argument for concern that they take considerable time. And there is
also a question of priorities; in the U.S., for example, criminal cases
take priority over civil cases. That seems a reasonable principle, but
it is likely to "delay" civil cases somewhat. The solution would be to
add court resources, but as in Japan" 4 additional resources have not
been provided in the U.S. for speeding up resolution of civil cases
even though there is pressure to reduce delay. The question how long
110. See Susan L. Keilitz, Roger A. Hanson & Henry W. K. Daley, Is CivilDiscovery
in State Courts Out of Control?, 17 ST. Cr. J. 8 (1993).
111. See THE LAW'S DELAY: ESSAYS ON UNDUE DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (C. H.
van Rhee, ed., 2005).
112. See Richard Marcus, Malaise of the Litigation Superpower, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN
CRISIS (A.A. Zuckerman, ed., 1999), at 71,88-92.
113. See Murray & Sturner, supra note 104, at 19.
114. SeeGOODMAN, supra note 10, at 196.
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cases should take to reach resolution cannot probably be answered
wholesale, but until it is determined how long they should take it is
difficult to become overly concerned about most objections based on
"delay."
The other perennial bugaboo of civil litigation is cost. A starting
point is to recognize that resolution of civil cases is going to cost
something, somebody will want to be paid to accomplish the
necessary tasks. One way of reducing that cost is to reduce the
number of tasks, or to assign them to others. The whole question of
party control or judicial control of the conduct of litigation is
inevitably connected to costs. If, for example, tasks presently
assigned to the parties' attorneys (with high billing rates) are
reassigned to court personnel (with lower civil service salaries), there
could be savings, but at a potential cost in delay (assuming
overloaded court staffs) and also in the ability of parties to direct the
preparation of their cases.
Reforming matters so basic as these is a challenge that should
await a crisis. Perhaps Lord Woolf's reforms in England promise
something revolutionary by requiring broad application of a central
principle of proportionality for all litigation activities. The
proportionality principle is directly addressed to balancing the costs
with the needs of litigations. The principle is that the pursuit of the
pearl of justice must take account of the price. Lord Woolf's idea of
adopting patterns for the various litigation tracks provides a suitable
general starting point. And English judges retain latitude to modify
as needed, with an overall expectation that they will be less forgiving
about delays than in the past. All the same, one suspects that the
expenditures on litigation in this party-centered system will still
exceed the costs that the German system permits, with its relatively
strict schedule of costs.
Despite invocation of the rhetoric of revolution, the recent
changes in the German and Japanese systems seem considerably less
aggressive. Indeed, the American experience suggests that the
rhetoric of revolution may be employed to defeat changes that hardly
would produce major shifts. For example, in 2000 the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were amended to narrow the scope of discovery
slightly to anything "relevant to the claim or defense of any party.""..5
From the perspective of the rest of the world, this is extremely broad,
but in the United States the change was denounced as
115. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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"revolutionary., 116 It was not, as a study by one of the opponents of
this change soon demonstrated. "7 But the charge suggests that heated
nature of procedure reform in the United States.
This sort of bluster is commonplace in discussions of procedural
reform in the United States. As we have seen, the reforms wrought
by CAFA look to be relatively unimportant. But the amount of ink
spilled and hot air expelled over that legislation was remarkable.
Similarly in other circumstances where the actual reform was really
quite modest. One way of explaining this behavior is to recognize
that the public participation invited for American procedural reform
excites the participants to indulge in overblown rhetoric. Another is
that overstatement about the harm that would result from change is
an antidote for crisis rhetoric about the need for reform.
There does not seem to be a similarly explosive aspect to
procedure reform - whether modest or major - in England, Germany,
or Japan. The changes wrought by Lord Woolf in England, in
particular, look well beyond what likely could now be accomplished
by the rulemakers in the United States. In this country, the Federal
Rules of 1938 accomplished revolutionary things, especially in
expanding discovery, but current rulemaking efforts are extremely
cautious by contrast (and despite being labeled "revolutionary"). As
a consequence, I concluded several years ago that major reform
would not come from the American rulemaking process."9 Although,
as we have seen, some legislation in Congress has made more
aggressive changes in certain areas, that also has been spotty and
episodic. Overall, American procedural reform since 1938 has been
decidedly evolutionary, and not significantly revolutionary. The
major breakthrough in the rules during the past quarter century - the
one emulated by Lord Woolf - was case management. But that arose
"from the ranks" because it was introduced by judges in metropolitan
districts and added to the national rules only because of that local
success. It was not, then, a genuine initiative of the national
rulemakers.
116. See Richard Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First
Century: Toward a New World Order, 7 LANE J. OF INT'L AND COMPAR. L. 153, 183
(1999) (quoting a member of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure who characterized the narrowing of discovery as "revolutionary").
117. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 200 Limitation
on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REv. 12 (2001) (finding that the
rule change had very modest effects in actual decisions).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
119. See Marcus, supra note 1.
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Even aggressive reforms often fall flat. One has only to
remember the American effort to impose proportionality on
discovery. Introduced in 1983 as a "180 degree shift" in attitude
toward discovery,'20 the amendment "created only a ripple in the
caselaw. '''21 Changing rules is easier than changing actual conduct of
lawyers and judges, and often results in unforeseen problems that
require further changes in rules. Thus, we are informed that, in
England, "[e]ach major reform of procedure has sought to simplify
the process of commencement and reduce its formal requirements."'22
In Japan, reforms adopted in 1996 to introduce some information
exchange failed because they had no enforcement mechanism.123
Even where there is a will, there may not be a way to change actual
practice.
VI. Conclusion - Room For More Study?
Perhaps Professor Leubsdorf had a point when he wrote of the
"myth" of civil procedure reform.' Although this myth is popular
among law professors, and therefore prevalent among the bar (which
is made up of their former students), there is, he suggests, no solid
evidence that reform has actually made any difference. Accordingly,
Leubsdorf proposes "a counter-myth": "[T]he great reforms had little
or no impact on the speed or cost of the average civil action.'
25
Despite this seeming nihilism, he affirms that "many procedural
changes do make many differences, some good and some bad,' 26 but
quickly adds that "it is hard to tell what changes will make what
difference.' '127  Indeed, it seems that some Americans who have
favored procedural reforms to affect substantive results - as was
attempted in the PSLRA - may be losing faith in this technique.
120. See supra text accompanying note 57.
121. 8 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & R. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
2008.1 at 122 (2d ed. 1994).
122. Zuckerman, supra note 13, at 125.
123. GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 285.
124. See John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil Procedure Reform, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN
CRISIS 53 (A.A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999).
125. Id at 63.
126. Id. at 65.
127. Id. at 66.
128. See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A
Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 505 (2005):
Placing procedural limits on tort litigation has been quite popular of late,
ranging from new scientific admissibility rules, to mandatory arbitration, to
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This paper began with an affirmation of the pathbreaking
importance of the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and explored the American experience as a way of
evaluating whether the mode of procedural reform is important to its
content or effect. Despite Leubsdorf's pessimism, I continue to think
that this is a subject worth pursuing because I think that procedural
changes do make differences. But the simple-minded hypotheses
about how modes and content might correlate suggested in Part II
seem not to fit America's recent reality as described in Part IV even if
they are consistent with the longer-term experience sketched in Part
III. Accordingly, one is left with the grab-bag of considerations
suggested in Part V based on some reflection on the experiences of a
few other countries in addition to the United States.
For the future, the question is whether further study would yield
insights or more mottled shades of gray. And if that is the prospect,
whether the study itself is worthwhile.
limits on class certification. Studies of the procedural mechanisms, however,
suggest that they have little or no effect on ultimate concerns.
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